fijate brasil... la tasa en reales se disparo.... y el real se te deprecio un 60%... el spread entre bonos en reales y bonos del tesoro se dispara por el diferencial de tasas. La gente corre por activos que creen seguros y de esa manera, ante la deflacion relativa de otros activos, por ejemplo commodities que utilizas para los procesos productivos que se te derrumbaron un 40% en unos dias, tu activo de inversion con tasas bajisimas te cubre de la mayor parte de las perdidas. Hay un efecto riqueza de esa empresa. Mañana si el mercado se tranquiliza podra salir a comprar contratos futuros a sus proveedores con un efecto riqueza a favor. Eso no estaba en la trampoa de liquidez de Keynes... Que es un concepto de como afecta la politiva monetaria a la IS cuando la LM se te acuesta...

Lo del spread es lo que te comente anteriormente. Esa es la explicacion mas justa

Mauromazza:

Dos noticias.

http://www.elrevolucionario.org/rev.php?articulo935

http://www.elrevolucionario.org/rev.php?articulo937

Las medidas que se han tomado hoy no han servido para nada, si, para perder el tiempo. Que opina de estas dos.

L_khyron:

Puede que tengas razón. Pero chistes, futuribles, diagnósticos y papeletas sobre la crisis hay de todos los colores. En España todos los niños de un año la han diagnosticado, en vez de "potitos" comen patatas espiscadas.

¡Leche! ... SOLUCIONES

Mientras tanto, la fuente puede que valga.

Discrepo Mauro. El efecto Pigou se va a dar, pero falta un buen tiempo para que lleguemos allá. Es evidente que HOY estamos en una trampa de liquidez, de la cual saldremos paulatinamente. En todo caso les recomiendo lean el artículo editorial de The Economist del 18 de septiembre, lo mejor que he leído sobre la tormenta actual, cito:

WHAT NEXT?
Sep 18th 2008


Global finance is being torn apart; it can be put back together again

FINANCE houses set out to be monuments of stone and steel. In the
widening gyre the greatest of them have splintered into matchwood. Ten
short days saw the nationalisation, failure or rescue of what was once
the world's biggest insurer, with assets of $1 trillion, two of the
world's biggest investment banks, with combined assets of another $1.5
trillion, and two giants of America's mortgage markets, with assets of
$1.8 trillion. The government of the world's leading capitalist nation
has been sucked deep into the maelstrom of its most capitalist
industry. And it looks overwhelmed.

The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch's rapid sale to
Bank of America were shocking enough. But the government rescue of
American International Group (AIG), through an $85 billion loan at
punitive interest rates thrown together on the evening of September
16th, marked a new low in an already catastrophic year. AIG is mostly a
safe, well-run insurer. But its financial-products division, which
accounted for just a fraction of its revenues, wrote enough derivatives
contracts to destroy the firm and shake the world. It helps explain one
of the mysteries of recent years: who was taking on the risk that banks
and investors were shedding? Now we know.

Yet AIG's rescue has done little to banish the naked fear that has the
markets in its grip. Pick your measure--the interest rates banks charge
to lend to each other, the extra costs of borrowing and of insuring
corporate debt, the flight to safety in Treasury bonds, gold, financial
stocks: all register contagion. On September 17th HBOS, Britain's
largest mortgage lender, fell into the arms of Lloyds TSB for a mere
GBP12 billion ($22 billion), after its shares pitched into the abyss
that had swallowed Lehman and AIG. Other banks, including Morgan
Stanley and Washington Mutual, looked as if they would suffer the same
fate. Russia said it would lend its three biggest banks 1.12 trillion
roubles ($44 billion). An American money-market fund, supposedly the
safest of safe investments, this week became the first since 1994 to
report a loss. If investors flee the money markets for Treasuries,
banks will lose funding and the contagion will suck in hedge funds and
companies. A brave man would see catharsis in all this misery; a wise
man would not be so hasty.

THE CENTRE CANNOT HOLD
Governments will thus often be the only buyers around. If necessary,
they may create a special fund to manage and wind down troubled assets.
Yet do not underestimate the cost of rescues, even necessary ones.
Nobody would buy Lehman unless the government offered them the sort of
help it had provided JPMorgan Chase when it saved Bear Stearns. The
nationalisation that, for good reason, wiped out Fannie's and Freddie's
shareholders has made it riskier for others to put fresh equity into
ailing banks. The only wise recapitalisation just now is an outright
purchase, preferably by a retail bank backed by deposits insured by the
government--as with Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Lloyds and HBOS
and, possibly, Wachovia with Morgan Stanley. The bigger the bank, the
harder that is. Most of all, each rescue discourages investors from
worrying about the creditworthiness of those they trade with--and thus
encourages the next excess.

For all the costs of a rescue, the cost of failure to the economy would
sometimes be higher. As finance shrinks, credit will be sucked out of
the economy and without credit, people cannot buy houses, run
businesses or as easily invest in the future. So far the American
economy has held up. The hope is that the housing bust is nearing its
bottom and that countries like China and India will continue to thrive.
Recent falls in the price of oil and other commodities give central
banks scope to cut interest rates--as China showed this week.

But there is a darker side, too. Unemployment in America rose to 6.1%
in August and is likely to climb further. Industrial production fell by
1.1% last month; and the annual change in retail sales is at its
weakest since the aftermath of the 2001 recession. Output is shrinking
in Japan, Germany, Spain and Britain, and is barely positive in many
other countries. On a quarterly basis, prices are falling in half of
the 20 countries in THE ECONOMIST's house-price index. Emerging
economies' stocks, bonds and currencies have been battered as investors
fret that they will no longer be "decoupled" from the rich countries.

Unless policymakers blunder unforgivably--by letting "systemic"
institutions fail or by keeping monetary policy too tight--there is no
need for today's misery to turn into a new Depression. A longer-term
worry is the inevitable urge to regulate modern finance into
submission. Though understandable, that desire is wrong and
dangerous--and the colossal success of commerce in the emerging world
(see article[1]) shows how much there is to lose. Finance is the brain
of the economy. For all its excesses, it allocates resources to where
they are productive better than any central planner ever could.

Regulation is necessary, and much must now be done to improve the laws
of finance. But it must be the right regulation: an end to America's
fragmented system of oversight; more transparency; capital requirements
that lean against booms and flex with busts; supervision of giants,
like AIG, that are too big and too interconnected to fail; accounting
that values risks better and that everyone accepts; clearing houses and
exchanges to make derivatives safer and less opaque.

All that would count as progress. But naive faith in regulators' powers
creates ruinous false security. Financiers know more than regulators
and their voices carry more weight in a boom. Banks can exploit the
regulations' inevitable blind spots: assets hidden off their balance
sheets, or insurance (such as that provided by AIG) which enables them
to profit by sliding out of the capital requirements the regulators
set. It is no accident that both schemes were at the heart of the
crisis.

This is a black week. Those of us who have supported financial
capitalism are open to the charge that the system we championed has
merely enabled a few spivs to get rich. But it helped produce healthy
economic growth and low inflation for a generation. It would take a
very big recession indeed to wipe out those gains. Do not forget that
in the debate ahead.

mauromazza:

GRACIAS.

Como también es cuestión de CONFIANZA y no tan solo de soltar "guita" a los bancos, para que esta venga antes, es necesario que algunos políticos y banqueros pasen por la cárcel.

mauromazza:

¿Esto crearía confianza? En vez de inyectarle dinero publico a los bancos, que lo preste directamente el Instituto de Crédito Oficial, (ICO)

Y que cada empresa se las peloteara como pudiera.

la recesiòn de argentina va ser peor que 2001.... no por la magnitud de la caìda, sino por el desangre en el tiempo.
Y ese desangre es el empobrecedor. Es el que no teja reaccionar. Es el sufrimiento de tener una estructura productiva basada en el cash flow diario. Es el drama de saber que las perdidas no recaen sobre accionistas, sino sobre el gasto neto de las empresas. Es el drama de la no profundidad del sistema. Serà un desangre que durarà años...... y de aca a un quinqueño, la clase media recordarà los viejos tiempos. Depreciaciones cambiarias de por medio que apenas compensan necesidades basicas de dolares, inflaciòn alta por expectativa, gasto del gobierno exorbitante, sin stock de ahorro privado (sin los 30 mil millones de las afjp que impulsaron la inversion en 2002), sin stock de servicios basicos, lo que es igual a stock energetico, gas.... con el gobierno decidiendo a dedo cuales son las prioridades crediticias del paìs, dado por las disponibilidades de cash....

Todo servido como en un clasico 1984, donde la verdad no serà revelada.... aunque se sienta en la realidad, y la paz que alguna vez supimos conseguir sea la guerra necesaria por la patria. La mentira el arma para ganarla, y la sociedad el elemento para conseguirlo.

Los 80 si fueron la decada perdida, esta serà la decada de la desintegraciòn de la sociedad..... = los de arriba haran lo que quieren y al costo que quieran. Por lo visto, ya lo empezamos a ver

ARGENTINA en caída libre: la contracción mas grande desde que se tiene registro, peor que la de febrero 2002 :O

Indice de Produccion Industrial
(Var. anual (%) ) - Febrero -14.0%
Tendencia de la Demanda
(Saldo de Respuestas) - Febrero -26%

http://www.fiel.org/publicaciones/CuadrosIC/200903.xls

tenían razón ellos...: "demasiado alarmismo"...

te acordas del blindaje¿?... y el "megacanje"... y "el peso tiene respaldo"??

el problema es que hay una subvaluación del 50% con el real, y el gasto publico en argentina necesita de un dolar de 6 pesos para volver a niveles de 2006 en dolares, nivel que ya era tarde. Salvo que estos tipos crean que argentina este año volverà a los mercados y el fondo le prestará 20 mil palos verdes. De ser así, retardarán quizas el proceso, pero hablando de probabilidades, ¿cuanto tiene ese escenario?... pocas